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4.1    Introduction
The Internet and electronic technologies more generally have a great 
potential for changing the way employer- employee matches are made (Autor 
2001). Since the mid-  1990s there has been a well-  documented increase in 
the number of Internet job boards and corporate websites devoted to job 
applications, and in the shares of job-  seekers and recruiters using online 
resources. For example, according to Taleo Research, the incidence of For-
tune 500 companies using their careers website as a corporate job board 
increased from 29 percent in 1998 to 92 percent in 2002. Moreover, the 
importance of online technologies may be underestimated, since the pos-
sible uses of the Internet in job search are multifaceted and go well beyond 
viewing advertisements or posting resumes (Kuhn 2000).1
However, it has been extremely diﬃcult to assess the impact of online 
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technologies on labor market outcomes. The Internet is believed to increase 
the amount of information available to recruiters and job-  seekers and at 
the same time to improve their ability to screen online applications and 
opportunities. Both aspects are likely to decrease the cost of job search and, 
therefore, to improve matching productivity (Pissarides 2000).
Nevertheless, it has also been noted that even if searching online has 
private individual beneﬁ  ts, it does not follow that the equilibrium eﬀects 
on labor market outcomes are socially beneﬁ  cial (Autor 2001). In a recent 
empirical investigation, Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) also ﬁ  nd that—once 
individual observable characteristics are controlled for—Internet seekers 
do not have shorter unemployment duration than other searchers and, in 
some speciﬁ  cation, it may even be longer. As the authors acknowledge, these 
results may be contaminated by selection into Internet job search on unob-
servables that are negatively correlated with employability. However, it is 
also possible that Internet search is counterproductive at the individual level 
because of the negative signal it might send to employers. Workers may still 
use the Internet, the authors argue, because it is very cheap and they are not 
aware of this drawback.
Therefore, despite their rapid diﬀusion, whether online electronic tech-
nologies are capable of increasing the overall eﬃciency with which workers 
and jobs are matched or, conversely, are merely cheaper substitutes for more 
traditional means (e.g., newspaper ads or face-  to-  face intermediation) is 
still an open issue.
This chapter evaluates the impact of the availability of electronic labor 
markets on the university-  to-  work transition. In particular, we study the 
eﬀects of a speciﬁ  c electronic intermediary, the interuniversity consortium 
AlmaLaurea, on graduates’ unemployment, mobility, and matching qual-
ity. In a nutshell, AlmaLaurea collects and organizes online information 
concerning college graduates’ curricula and, conditional on their permis-
sion, sells it to ﬁ  rms in electronic format. Hence, similar to other commer-
cial job boards, it makes information about searching candidates available 
online. However, it also contains information on almost the entire universe 
of graduates from the institutions that it serves.
The present case study provides exceptional evidence on the eﬀect of 
online labor market intermediaries for two main reasons: ﬁ  rst, the impact 
of AlmaLaurea is observed during a time period when e-  recruitment was 
almost nonexistent in Italy. AlmaLaurea was founded in 1994 and, to the 
best of our knowledge, until 1999 there were no major Internet job boards 
operating in Italy. Second, diﬀerent timing of universities’ enrollment in 
AlmaLaurea produces counterfactuals that allow us to tackle the problems 
faced by previous empirical investigations. Although today most Italian 
universities are members of AlmaLaurea, a smaller subset was in the con-
sortium at the time our data were collected. We identify the average eﬀect 
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might have used its services—comparing the dynamics of their employment 
outcomes with those of graduates from universities that were not members. 
Hence, we aim at estimating the eﬀect of the availability of electronic inter-
mediaries, not the private beneﬁ  ts of using them.
Formally, we measure the eﬀect of AlmaLaurea using the diﬀerence- in-
 diﬀerences (DID) approach applied to a repeated cross-  sectional data set. 
The data set is built by merging two distinct (but almost identical) surveys 
run by the Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT) on representative samples of two 
cohorts of university graduates interviewed three years after graduation. 
Given that AlmaLaurea intermediation activity only started in a subset of 
universities in the period between the graduation of the two cohorts, we split 
the sample into two distinct groups: graduates who completed their degree in 
a university that joined AlmaLaurea in 1996 and 1997 (the treatment group) 
and those who graduated from universities not members of AlmaLaurea dur-
ing that period (the control group). The subtleties of envisaging participa-
tion of academic institutions in AlmaLaurea as a quasi-  natural experiment 
are discussed in more depth in the following. Here, it suﬃces to say that, 
ﬁ  rst, individual decisions concerning college enrollment were made before 
AlmaLaurea came into being; second, graduates and universities in the two 
groups are not statistically diﬀerent in terms of observable characteristics; 
third, according to personal conversations with the consortium’s director, 
initially membership in AlmaLaurea was fairly accidental and mostly based 
on informal relationships among a few faculties.
AlmaLaurea, as we discuss more thoroughly in the following, has a num-
ber of features that make it likely to be eﬀective. First, it collects oﬃcial 
information, which is partially disclosed to ﬁ  rms, concerning also those 
individuals who decide not to post their resumes online. Second, it achieves 
very high enrollment rates from graduates. We conjecture that these features 
are likely to reduce adverse selection.
According to our most conservative estimate, AlmaLaurea decreases the 
probability of unemployment by about 1.6 percentage points and has a posi-
tive eﬀect on wages and two self-  reported measures of job satisfaction. We 
also ﬁ  nd that it fosters graduates’ geographical mobility.
To check the robustness of these ﬁ  ndings, we test for pretreatment paral-
lel outcomes and ﬁ  nd that graduates from the two groups of universities 
had similar employment dynamics prior to AlmaLaurea’s operation. Our 
results might also be aﬀected by the adverse consequence of AlmaLaurea for 
graduates from universities, not members of the consortium. To control for 
this possibility, we build alternative treatment and control groups based on 
geographical proximity. We ﬁ  nd no evidence of such a negative eﬀect.
Our work is related to the growing number of studies that investigate 
the eﬀect of the Internet and electronic technologies on the labor market 
(Autor 2001; Freeman 2002). Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) study the impact 
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According to their analysis, there are no discernible diﬀerences between 
transition to employment of online and traditional searchers. They con-
clude that either online search is ineﬀective or that Internet job searchers are 
negatively selected. In a recent paper—methodologically similar to ours—
Kroft and Pope (2008) exploit the uneven geographical expansion of the 
website Craigslist to assess the impact of online search on labor and housing 
markets eﬃciency. Although, consistent with Kuhn and Skuterud (2004), 
they ﬁ  nd that online search had no eﬀect on the unemployment rate, they 
did ﬁ  nd that it lowered more traditional classiﬁ  ed job advertisements in 
newspapers. Stevenson (2008) investigates the importance of online tech-
nologies on employed online job search and ﬁ  nds that in the United States, 
state-  level rise in Internet penetration is associated with state-  level rise in 
employer- to- employer worker ﬂ  ows. In this chapter, we focus on the impact 
of online search on a speciﬁ  c segment of the labor market—that is, transi-
tion of university to work.
Our study is also useful for policy evaluation and formulation: the consor-
tium AlmaLaurea is coﬁ  nanced by the Italian Ministry of Education; there-
fore, clear evidence on its eﬀectiveness is useful for evaluating how public 
money is spent.2 Moreover, should AlmaLaurea prove to be an eﬀective 
institutional arrangement, other European countries might learn from its 
example, improving public policy aimed at facilitating the university-  to-
 work  transition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents an 
overview of the university- to- work transition in Italy, provides an in- depth 
description of the AlmaLaurea consortium, and brieﬂ  y discusses the eco-
nomics of online labor market intermediaries. Section 4.3 outlines the iden-
tiﬁ  cation assumptions needed to make our empirical strategy valid. Section 
4.4 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4.5 presents the main 
results. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 justify the validity of the results of our empirical 
approach, and section 4.8 concludes.
4.2    Background
4.2.1     University- to- Work  Transition  in  Italy
Labor market functioning is deeply aﬀected by diﬀerent kinds of informa-
tion imperfections and asymmetries. The education-  to-  work transition is 
particularly exposed to these imperfections: ﬁ  rst-  time job seekers typically 
lack work experience, and this negatively aﬀects both their outlooks con-
2. Given that we do not know the magnitude of public funding invested, we are not able to 
measure whether AlmaLaurea is a worthwhile social investment; we can only measure whether 
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cerning employment opportunities and job characteristics, and employers’ 
screening options.
In most countries, unemployment rates are lower for university gradu-
ates than for the rest of labor force, and highly educated people experience 
a smoother entry into working life (Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development [OECD] 2007). As table 4.1 shows, however, inter-
national comparisons depict the university-  to-  work transition in Italy as 
one of the most problematic cases among industrialized countries.3 There 
are three main possible explanations for this. First, there are frictions on 
the supply side: it might be that education provided by Italian universities 
is of such a low standard that graduates are obliged to undertake further 
training, either formal or informal, before getting into work. Second, the 
slow transition rates may be due to labor demand characteristics: the Italian 
industrial structure, compared to that of other developed countries, is biased 
in favor of small ﬁ  rms and low-  tech industries that typically do not employ 
highly qualiﬁ  ed workers. Third, there may be ineﬃciencies in the matching 
mechanisms caused by information imperfections and, possibly, by lack of 
intermediaries.
AlmaLaurea potentially improves labor market functioning for two rea-
sons. First, it reduces search costs for both ﬁ  rms and workers by making 
accurate qualiﬁ  cation, grade, and study data readily available. Second, it 
may mitigate adverse selection by making it possible to compare searching 
students with others in their cohorts.
Universities are often active actors in labor market intermediation. For 
instance, most academic institutions set up and manage placement oﬃces 
and, in some cases, their faculties establish informal ties with ﬁ  rms.4 How-
ever, when universities receive ﬁ  nancial resources on a relatively egalitarian 
 Table 4.1  Employment rates of university graduates by age class—2004
Age class
  Country   25–29   30–34   35–39  
Denmark 79.7 87.7 91.2
Finland 84.4 86.7 87.9
France 80.1 85.0 87.5
Greece 72.2 85.5 87.9
Italy 58.0 81.9 89.4
Spain 76.3 85.9 86.7
Sweden 76.6 88.2 88.3
  United Kingdom   90.5   98.1   90.1  
Source: Eurostat.
3. See also the data in Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (2002).
4. See Rebick (2000) for an insightful account of the Japanese case.132        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
basis and their graduates’ labor market performance does not aﬀect their 
ﬁ  nancial endowments, they may have little incentive to concern themselves 
with students’ placement. In Italy, before AlmaLaurea was established, 
public universities were involved in minimal formal intermediation activity.5 
Table 4.2 refers to 1995 graduates and, for a selected sample of European 
countries, displays the share of graduates who used the services of their 
institutions’ placement oﬃce (ﬁ  rst column) and the share of graduates who 
got their ﬁ  rst job through this channel (second column). It can be seen that 
Italy ranks low, higher only than Germany, in both respects.6
4.2.2    AlmaLaurea
AlmaLaurea was founded in 1994 and began online intermediation in 
1995 at a time when, to the best of our knowledge, there were no other 
Internet job boards in Italy. Monster and InfoJob, the current most popular 
e-  recruitment sites (according to Nielsen/  NetRatings) started in 2001 and 
2004, respectively.7
Initially run by the Statistical Observatory of the University of Bologna, 
AlmaLaurea is currently managed by a consortium of ﬁ  fty private and public 
5. There is anecdotal evidence that several departments on an informal basis provided unor-
ganized, paper-  based information on their graduates to recruiting companies.
6. Percentages are calculated using the data set built by a European Community-  funded 
project under the Targeted Socio-  Economic Research (TSER) “Careers after Higher Educa-
tion: a European Research Study.” See http:/  /  www.uni-  kassel.de/  wz1/  tseregs.htm for details.
7. It ultimately proved impossible to establish with any precision the timing of the ﬁ  rst Ital-
ian Internet job board. Nevertheless, according to personal communications with industry 
experts in the ﬁ  eld the ﬁ  rst was JobPilot, which was founded in 1999 and was acquired by 
Monster in 2005.
Table 4.2  University graduates using university placement oﬃces




United Kingdom 37.6 6.61
  Germany   6.6   0.54  
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on the data set produced by the Project funded by the 
European Community under the Targeted Socio-  Economic Research (TSER) “Careers after 
Higher Education: A European Research Study.” Details on the project and downloadable 
material can be found at http://www.uni-  kassel.de/wz1/tseregs.htm.2.
Notes: The relevant questions (asked in 1998 to graduates who obtained their degree between 
autumn 1994 and summer 1995) were: (a) “How did you search for your ﬁ  rst job after gradu-
ation?”; (b) “Which method was most important for getting your ﬁ  rst job after graduation?” 
Multiple options follow, among which “I enlisted the help of a careers/placement oﬃce in my 
higher education institution.” The ratios displayed are computed, respectively, over graduates 
who have sought a job and over those graduates who have been employed at least once.Do Online Labor Market Intermediaries Matter?    1 3 3
universities, with the support of the Italian Ministry of Education. Member 
universities pay a one-  time association fee (ranging from 2,582 to 5,165 
euros, according to the size of the university) and an annual subscription fee 
for the collection and the insertion of new data in the AlmaLaurea database 
(4.96 euros for each student in the database).
AlmaLaurea’s institutional objectives are twofold. First, it provides mem-
ber academic institutions with reliable information on their graduates. Sec-
ond, it aims at facilitating graduates’ labor market transition.
In terms of the ﬁ  rst objective, AlmaLaurea manages a database that col-
lects information on graduates, drawing it from three distinct sources. First, 
academic institutions provide oﬃcial data on grades, course durations, and 
degrees received for their alumni. Second, undergraduates provide several 
pieces of information, including military service obligations, periods of 
study abroad, work experience, and a self-  evaluation concerning foreign 
languages and computer skills. Finally, graduates have the option to upload 
and update their curricula online for up to three years after graduation.8 In 
accordance with Italian privacy law, only a subset of the information in the 
database can be disclosed to third parties.9
With respect to the second objective, AlmaLaurea manages a service that 
gives ﬁ  rm electronic access to graduates’ curriculum vitae (CV). The CV is 
an electronic ﬁ  le containing biographical information, age at graduation, 
university and high school grades, information on internships, experience 
abroad, postgraduate education, languages and computer skills, work expe-
rience, and work preferences (i.e., type of occupation desired, location, and 
contract preferred). Graduates may include additional information and a 
cover letter.10
The service is free for graduates. Firms and other institutions can browse 
individual curricula and observe populational aggregate information for 
free, but are required to pay if they want to contact a particular graduate. 
The price ranges between 0.5 and 10 euros per CV, depending on the type 
of subscription and the number of curricula acquired.11
Table 4.3 provides an overview of AlmaLaurea’s history and performance. 
It displays the number of universities enrolled, the share of graduates from 
AlmaLaurea universities, the numbers of resumes available to ﬁ  rms, and 
number sold by the consortium.
8. Recently, the option was extended to ﬁ  ve years.
9. More information can be found online at http:/  /  www.almalaurea.it/  eng/  index.shtml.
10. A sample CV (in Italian) is available at: http:/  /  www.almalaurea.it/  info/    aiuto/    aziende/   
esempio  _cv.shtml.
11. Firms can choose between self- service or subscription. The so- called self- service involves 
payment of ﬁ  fty euros, after which any number of CVs can be acquired at the cost of ten Euros 
per CV. Subscription allows a ﬁ  rm to prepay for a whole package of downloadable CVs, over 
a period of one year. The range is between 200 CVs for around 500 euros, and up to 5,000 CVs 
for 2,600 euros. More detailed information is available (in Italian) at http:/  /  www.almalaurea
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4.2.3    AlmaLaurea and the Economics of Electronic Labor Markets
The AlmaLaurea recruitment service turns out to be an insightful ex-
ample concerning how online communication technologies—coupled with 
more traditional forms of intermediation—might ameliorate the way in 
which employers and employees match in the labor market. Online labor 
market intermediaries are expected to decrease the search costs for both 
employers and employees. Standard search theory predicts that, everything 
being equal, this should lead to better matches. Conversely, the eﬀects on 
unemployment duration are ambiguous. In fact, although Burdett and 
Ondrich (1985) suggest that it is unlikely, online technologies might induce 
both job-  seekers and employers to be more choosy and to increase their 
reservation wages and screening standards (Pissarides 2000). Finally, online 
labor market intermediaries are expected to weaken the constraints posed by 
geographical distance (Autor 2001). Consistently, in the AlmaLaurea case 
most graduates’ curricula are bought by ﬁ  rms located in regions other than 
the one where the individual graduated (see table 4.3).
On the other hand, a likely consequence of lower costs in distinct job 
search channels is that job seekers, ceteris paribus, will apply for more jobs. 
And when employers perceive such excess application to be a problem, 
adverse selection is likely to undermine the eﬀectiveness of cheap search 
methods (Autor 2001).
With the exception of time required to update personal information, 
AlmaLaurea is completely free for students and therefore is potentially 
exposed to the adverse selection problem referred to previously: employers 
might expect that individuals who upload and update their resumes online 
are somehow negatively selected. However, AlmaLaurea’s organizational 
features are likely to make its intermediation activity less exposed to this 
risk for two reasons.
First, as explained previously, some pieces of the information contained 
in the AlmaLaurea data set concern the entire graduate population and are 
provided directly by academic institutions. This information is organized 
by AlmaLaurea and made freely available online at its website.12 For every 
member university and degree, the website provides information on average 
grades, share of students who completed their degree on time, and the share 
of individuals who studied abroad within an EU subsidized program. There-
fore, employers who purchase a CV should be able to identify diﬀerences 
between the selected job-  seeker and the entire graduate population, which 
considerably reduces the adverse selection problem.
Second, academic institutions that joined AlmaLaurea are able to enroll 
the vast majority of their graduates. For instance, more than 92 percent of 
1998 graduates updated their CVs online at least once. High participation 
12.  See  (in  Italian)  http:/ / www.almalaurea.it/ cgi- php/ aziende/ proﬁ  lo/  proﬁ  lo.php.136        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
rates have been very eﬀective in building a good reputation for the service, 
and make adverse selection unlikely. To sum up, we expect that AlmaLau-
rea’s particular organizational features protect it from the disadvantages of 
online labor markets.
4.3    The  Empirical  Strategy
The basic goal of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of a treatment; 
that is, the availability of online labor market intermediaries on an array 
of labor market outcomes—that is, the probability of being unemployed, 
mobility, and matching quality. This section formalizes and explicitly dis-
cusses our empirical approach and outlines the strategies employed to assess 
its validity.
One of the most serious empirical problems that arises in assessing the 
impact of online intermediaries is that job-  seekers and ﬁ  rms typically self 
select in the adoption of online technologies. It is therefore diﬃcult to iden-
tify to what extent the correlation between their use and labor market out-
comes stems from the technology itself and to what extent it stems from 
some important and diﬃcult- to- measure  individual  characteristics.
In this chapter we can rely on a transparent exogenous source of variation; 
that is, the timing of universities’ enrollment in AlmaLaurea. This heteroge-
neity allows us to apply the DID method to a repeated cross-  sectional data 
set. This helps to overcome the previously mentioned problem.
The simple DID framework can be described as follows. The causal eﬀect 
of a treatment on an outcome is deﬁ  ned as the diﬀerence between two poten-
tial outcomes (Rubin 1974; Heckman 1990). Of course, it is impossible to 
observe such an eﬀect for a given individual. However, it is possible to iden-
tify an average eﬀect if the population of interest is observed in at least 
two distinct time periods, if only a fraction of the population is exposed to 
treatment, and if we assume parallel paths over time for treated and con-
trols. The main intuition is that, under this design, an untreated group of 
the population is used to identify time variation in the outcome that is not 
due to treatment exposure.
More formally, each individual i belongs to one group, Gi  {0, 1}, where 
for convenience group 1 is the treatment group and 0 the control one. More-
over, individual i is observed only in time period T i  {0, 1}. Let Ii  Gi T i 
denote an indicator for the actual subministration of treatment.13 Then Yi
N(t) 
and Yi
I(t) represent two potential outcomes: respectively, that achieved by i 
at time t if not treated and that achieved if treated before t.
The fundamental problem in identifying the treatment eﬀect on individual 
i, deﬁ  ned as Yi
I(t) – Yi
N(t), is that for any particular individual, it is not pos-
13. Note that in our simple setting Ii assumes the value 1 only for the treatment group 
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sible to observe both potential outcomes. What we do observe is the realized 
outcome, which can be written as Y i(t)  Yi
I(t)  Ii  Yi
N(t)  (1 – Ii).
If it is assumed that
(1)  E[Yi
N(1) – Yi
N(0)⏐Gi  1]  E[Yi
N(1) – YN(0)⏐Gi  0],
then it easily follows that
(2)  E[Yi
I(1) – Yi
N(1)⏐Gi  1]  E[Y i(1)⏐Gi  1] – E[Y i(0)⏐Gi  1]
– {E[Y i(1)⏐Gi  0] – E[Y i(0)⏐Gi  0]}.
In other words, if the average outcomes for the treatment and control groups 
had parallel paths over time in the absence of treatment, then the so-  called 
average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) can be expressed as something 
whose sample counterpart is observable; that is, as the average variation of 
the treatment group purged by the average variation of the control group.
Hence in the present study, it is assumed that in absence of AlmaLaurea 
the average occupational outcomes of graduates from early joining uni-
versities (hereafter AlmaLaurea universities) would have followed the same 
dynamics as those of graduates from universities that either joined later 
or did not join (hereafter non-  AlmaLaurea universities). Thus the average 
eﬀect of AlmaLaurea is obtained simply by subtracting the dynamics of the 
graduates of the control group from the dynamics of those in the treatment 
group.
The previous estimator is easily obtained as
(3)  Y i      Gi    T i    (Gi  T i)  ui,
where  is the ATT and the assumption stated in equation (1) is equivalent 
to mean independence.
The validity of our approach faces a number of threats. As far as the so- 
called internal validity is concerned—that is, the causal eﬀect within the con-
text of the study—there are two main problems.14 First, the compositional 
eﬀect: the use of repeated cross sections is only valid when the composition 
of the target population does not change between the two periods; that is, ui 
⊥ T i ⏐Gi. Given that individual decisions concerning college enrollment were 
taken before the existence of AlmaLaurea, we can presume that, in our case, 
this problem is not very severe. Nevertheless, following standard practice, 
we shall test whether the means of relevant characteristics of the population 
within each group did change unevenly between the pretreatment and the 
posttreatment periods.
Second, the assumption of parallel dynamics in the absence of treatment 
between the two groups (equation [1]) turns out to be strong. It is, in fact, 
possible that the two groups have diﬀerent trends for reasons other than 
14. See Meyer (1995) for a comprehensive discussion of internal validity in this frame-
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treatment. However, if nonparallel dynamics are due to observables, we can 
overcome the problem by including covariates. This analysis, as we discuss 
in detail in section 4.4, relies on a large array of individual and university 
covariates. Nevertheless, if the dynamics of the outcome variables of the 
two groups are aﬀected by unobservables, identiﬁ  cation breaks down.15 In 
section 4.6 we try to overcome this important problem using data for an 
additional pretreatment period in order to test for nonparallel paths between 
the treatment and control groups before treatment.
Another issue concerns the unit of analysis of our ATT. It could be that 
AlmaLaurea might not be an appropriate individual level treatment, since 
member institutions are enrolled at once, and there are possibly important 
interactions among each university’s students. If, for instance, the impact of 
AlmaLaurea on a given student depends on the characteristics of students in 
his or her cohort, we are measuring the eﬀect on university rather than the 
individual graduate employment performance. Although in the present study 
we model AlmaLaurea as an individual level treatment, in future research we 
aim to investigate the possibility of within-  university spillovers.
Similarly, to be valid, the DID approach assumes no interactions among 
the agents in the treatment and control groups. If, for example, AlmaLaurea 
graduates improved occupational outcomes harm non- AlmaLaurea gradu-
ates, our estimates have very diﬀerent implications, especially in terms of 
informing policy. In section 4.7, we try to assess this problem by identifying 
additional control and treatment groups that include only graduates from 
those universities that are located in the same geographical region.
Finally, in order to generalize the results to diﬀerent individuals and con-
texts, external validity is important. It is possible that AlmaLaurea would 
not have had an eﬀect for graduates from those universities that chose not 
to join. This would also explain why they did not join. However, we do not 
think this is a major problem since, as mentioned in the introduction, mem-
bership tended to be accidental, at least during the ﬁ  rst years. Nevertheless, 
in the following we test whether the observable characteristics of the univer-
sities in the two groups diﬀer signiﬁ  cantly.
4.4    The  Data
Our data on graduates are drawn from two almost identical surveys—
Indagine Inserimento Professionale Laureati (Survey on University- to- Work 
Transition) in 1998 and 2001 of individuals who graduated in 1995 and 1998, 
respectively.16
15. Given that decisions to enroll in AlmaLaurea are made by universities, we are mostly 
concerned with university unobservables.
16. The publicly available microdata do not include information concerning from which 
university the surveyed individual graduated. Therefore, we carried out the analysis at the 
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To implement the econometric approach described in section 4.3 we 
include in our main treatment group those individuals graduating from uni-
versities that joined AlmaLaurea in 1996 and 1997. As shown in table 4.4, this 
includes the universities of Modena-  Reggio Emilia, Ferrara, Parma, Flor-
ence, Catania, Trieste, Udine, Messina, Chieti, Trento, Molise, and Venice 
School of Architecture. Students in the treatment group account for about 
18 percent of the sample (see table 4.5).
In section 4.5.2, we exploit an additional source of variation. As shown 
in table 4.4, the Universities of Turin and Eastern Piedmont start selling 
graduates’ CVs only after August 1998. Thus, we used graduates from these 
universities as an additional treatment group in a DID setting in which the 
“before and after” are the time of graduation before and after August 1998, 
and only graduates from 1998 are considered.17
Unfortunately, ISTAT does not provide information concerning the 
month of graduation for 1995 graduates. Therefore, graduates from Bolo-
gna are not considered in the analysis.18
The ISTAT target samples consist of 25,716 individuals in 1998 and 36,373 
individuals in 2001. They represent, respectively, 25 percent and 28.1 percent 
of the total population of Italian university graduates. The responses were 
64.7 percent and 53.3 percent, for a total of 17,326 and 20,844 respondents.19 
After eliminating individuals who did not respond to the question concern-
Table 4.4  Universities enrolled in AlmaLaurea
1994 University of Bologna starts collecting electronic data concerning its 
graduates
1995 University of Bologna starts selling data
1996 University of Modena-  Reggio Emilia, Ferrara, Parma, and Florence start 
selling data
1997 University of Catania, Trieste, Udine, Messina, Chieti, Trento, Molise, and 
Venice School of Architecture start selling data
August 1998  University of Turin and Eastern Piedmont start selling data
Note: The Venice School of Architecture started selling data on January 1. For consistency, it 
is included in 1997 group. The universities of Siena and Lecce joined in 1997, but did not start 
to sell CVs until 1999 and 2003, respectively. All the information is available on the AlmaLau-
rea website.
17. In Italy, graduates can complete their degree at diﬀerent times in the same academic year, 
depending on when they ﬁ  nish their dissertation.
18. Bologna is also a very special case, the most self- selected one, given that it is the university 
where AlmaLaurea got started. However, results do not change qualitatively whether we include 
Bologna graduates in the control group or the treatment group.
19. Diﬀerences in response rates probably stem from the diﬀerent interviewing techniques 
in the surveys: in 1998, ISTAT mailed paper-  based questionnaires, while in 2001 the CATI 
(Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) was used. In principle, this change should aﬀect 
universities in a homogenous way and therefore it should not represent a major problem for 
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ing their employment status, those with missing values for key variables, 
and graduates from Bologna, Turin, and Eastern Piedmont, we are left with 
15,282 and 18,181 observations, respectively. In both years the sample is 
stratiﬁ  ed according to sex, university, and university degree, and in the fol-
lowing analysis all estimations are performed using stratiﬁ  cation weights.
The surveys collect information on: (a) school and university curricula; 
(b) labor market experience; and (c) demographic and social backgrounds 
of graduates. Table 4.5 presents summary statistics for the key variables. In 
the following analysis, individual level right- hand variables are grouped into 
two subsets. The ﬁ  rst includes characteristics that are predetermined with 
respect to college eﬀorts and outcomes: sex, age, high school grades, fourteen 
dummies for high school type, one dummy for having two university degrees, 
ﬁ  ve dummies for each parent’s level of education, 104 dummies for province 
of residence before college enrollment, and 345 dummies for departments 
(university  ﬁ  eld of study). The second contains indicators related to college 
curricula that could—at least potentially—be inﬂ  uenced by AlmaLaurea: 
university grade and number of years to graduation.
As table 4.5 shows, with the exception only of the share of women, which 
increased for both groups, the remaining variables show no notable varia-
Table 4.5  Sample design and means of key variables
    All   AlmaLaurea   Non-  AlmaLaurea
1998 Survey
Number of graduates 15,282 3,512 11,770
Weighted share .188 .812
2001 Survey:
Number of graduates 18,181 3,515 14,666
Weighted share .183 .817
Means of selected sample characteristics in 1998
Share of female .527 .528 .527
(.004) (.010) (.005)
Age 27.45 27.61 27.41
(.038) (.086) (.042)
High school grade 48.38 47.87 48.49
(.066) (.151) (.074)
Means of selected sample characteristics in 2001
Share of female .551 .567 .548
(.004) (.009) (.004)
Age 27.47 27.55 27.45
(.028) (.063) (.031)
High school grade 48.96 48.62 49.04
    (.057)   (.130)   (.064)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Shares, means, and standard errors are computed with 
stratiﬁ  cation weights. High school grades range from 36 to 60. Only individuals that responded 
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tions within groups over time. Moreover, control and treatment groups present 
very similar characteristics for both years, reducing the possibilities of major 
interactions (beyond the treatment itself) at the individual level, of between 
being enrolled in a college member of AlmaLaurea and graduating in 1998.
In order to control for observable variations in academic institution qual-
ity, we use data on university characteristics provided by ISTAT in its annual 
Lo Stato dell’Universitá (University Indicators), for the academic years 1991 
to 1998. In particular, we collect information at the level of the individual 
university, on numbers of students, professors, and delayed students.20 Table 
4.6 shows that universities in the treatment group enroll fewer students per 
professor than the universities in the control group. The diﬀerence, however, 
is not statistically signiﬁ  cant. The two groups have very similar average rates 
of delayed students. Both indicators are generally considered proxies for 
university teaching quality.21 Note, also, that the share of delayed students 
increased in both groups, but the increase is steeper for the treatment group. 
In terms of overall number of students, the two groups of universities have 
very similar averages.
Finally, to control for major economic shocks that may aﬀect graduate 
labor market performance, we collect province-  level information on per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rates.22
20. In Italy, most students graduate after the oﬃcial deadline.
21. As discussed in Bagues, Sylos Labini, and Zinovyera (2008), both indicators have draw-
backs in a system such as the Italian one, where most universities cannot restrict entry and 
therefore the number of students per professor depends, among other things, on demand.
22. Italy is composed of 104 provinces, which correspond approximately to U.S. counties.
Table 4.6  Universities’ characteristics
    All   AlmaLaurea   Non-  AlmaLaurea
Universities in 1995
Number of universities 59 12 47
Average number of students 23,946 22,033 24,434
(3,742) (4,569) (4,568)
Average number of students per professor 31.09 26.27 32.32
(2.59) (2.53) (3.17)
Average share of delayed students .288 .278 .291
(.010) (.026) (.011)
Universities in 1998
Number of universities 61 12 49
Average number of students 25,473 24,134 25,801
(3,875) (5,096) (4,679)
Average number of students per professor 31.82 26.50 33.12
(2.36) (3.15) (2.82)
Average share of delayed students .362 .396 .354
    (.011)   (.029)   (.012)
Notes: Averages are computed at university level. Standard errors in parentheses.142        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
The present study considers three basic outcome variables measured three 
years after graduation: occupational status, which takes the value 1 if an 
individual is unemployed, and zero otherwise;23 regional mobility, which 
takes the value 1 if the individual resides in a diﬀerent region from the 
one where he or she graduated;24 and wage, measured as net monthly wage 
expressed in euros and self reported by the interviewed. We also consider two 
additional proxies for matching productivity. The ﬁ  rst is for the perceived 
level of adequacy of the knowledge acquired at university with respect to 
the content of the present job. The second is related to the perceived stability 
of the job. Both variables are self reported and take values from 1, not at all 
satisﬁ  ed, to 4, very satisﬁ  ed.
4.5    The  Impact  of  AlmaLaurea
4.5.1      Universities That Joined in 1996 and 1997
A ﬁ  rst picture of the impact of AlmaLaurea is obtained by comparing 
time diﬀerences in means of key outcomes within the two groups (treatment 
and control). Table 4.7 shows that unemployment rates decreased sharply 
from 1998 to 2001 for the whole target population.25 Moreover, and most 
importantly for the present study, occupational status improved the most for 
those in the treated group: the rate of unemployment decreased about 3.5 
points more than in the control group. Note also that the ranking between 
the two groups reverses. This means that the same qualitative result would 
be obtained if we used changes in employment logs as outcome variables.
For mobility, rates remained stable for AlmaLaurea students, and 
decreased for non-  AlmaLaurea ones. Hence, for graduates in the treatment 
group, regional mobility increased by about 1 point relative to graduates in 
the control group. However, this diﬀerence is not statistically diﬀerent from 
zero. Note also that graduates in the treatment group are more mobile than 
those in the control group. Finally, in terms of matching quality, monthly 
wages increased by some forty-  four euros more for AlmaLaurea graduates 
than for the control group.
To interpret these results as being the sole eﬀect of AlmaLaurea involves 
23. Following standard deﬁ  nitions, we consider unemployed to be those individuals who 
declare not to having worked during the week before the interview and to be searching for 
a job.
24. Italy is composed of twenty regions.
25. Italian labor market conditions improved substantially between 1998 and 2001. Accord-
ing to ISTAT, standardized unemployment rates for the entire population were 11.7 in 1998 and 
9.4 in 2001. The change was from 12.8 to 9.8 for university graduates aged between twenty- ﬁ  ve 
and thirty-  nine. It could be that our ﬁ  gures display a steeper decrease because individuals in 
the sample are younger and because of the changes made to the survey technique mentioned 
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assuming that in the absence of the treatment the averages of the two groups 
would have experienced the same variation (equation [1]). This is a strong 
restriction when treatment (i.e., graduating from a university enrolled in 
AlmaLaurea) is not randomly assigned across individuals. In the remaining 
part of the chapter we use the approaches outlined in section 4.3 to assess 
the extent to which the observed changes may be interpreted as the eﬀect 
of AlmaLaurea.
The basic identiﬁ  cation assumption of the DID method (equation [1]) 
may be too stringent if treatment and control groups are unbalanced in 
covariates that are thought to be associated with the dynamics of the out-
come variable. To begin with, we follow the traditional way to accommodate 
this problem and introduce a linear set of controls Xi in equation (3), which 
then becomes:
(4)  Y i    	  Xi    Gi    T i    (Gi  T i)  ui.
Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 report ordinary least square (OLS) coeﬃcients of 
this equation where the outcome is, respectively, unemployment, mobility, 
and log wages. All standard errors are corrected for the nonindependence of 
employment outcomes of individuals graduating in the same region, degree, 
Table 4.7  Unemployment, mobility, and wages by year and AlmaLaurea
      1998   2001   Diﬀ.  
Unemployment
AlmaLaurea .228 .094 –.134




AlmaLaurea .297 .292 –.005




AlmaLaurea 899.7 1,118.4 218.7
Non-  AlmaLaurea 980.9 1,155.1 174.2
Diﬀ. 44.5∗∗∗
  Standard error           (16.8)  
Notes: Unemployment rates are computed using stratiﬁ  cation weights. We consider unem-
ployed to be those individuals who did not work during the week before the interview who 
were looking for a job. Average gross monthly wages are expressed in euros and are calculated 
for the 20,838 individuals that provide this information. The bold diﬀerences are the results of 
a DID estimation, where Diﬀ  (Y 01
Alma – Y 98
Alma) – (Y 01
non- Alma – Y 98
non- Alma). In parentheses are 
robust standard errors of regressions of the dependent variables on dummies for year, belong-
ing to AlmaLaurea, and their interaction.144        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
and year.26 The analysis is structured along the classiﬁ  cation described in 
section 4.4—hence four speciﬁ  cations are displayed: column (1) includes 
individual characteristics predetermined before university entry; column 
(2) presents also potentially endogenous individual controls; column (3) 
incorporates time- variant university characteristics; and column (4) displays 
the results of a regression that includes province unemployment and GDP 
per capita. Note that all speciﬁ  cations include university time department 
dummies.
Table 4.8 shows that, conditional on individual characteristics, if a uni-
versity decides to aﬃliate to AlmaLaurea the probability that its graduates 
are unemployed three years after graduation signiﬁ  cantly decreases by about 
two points. Potentially endogenous individual regressors (column [2]) and 
university controls (column [3]) do not signiﬁ  cantly aﬀect our results. Con-
versely, controlling for provincial unemployment rates and GDP (column 
[4]) reduces the magnitude of the coeﬃcient to about 1.6 points, and also 
26. If we cluster standard errors at university level, most of the coeﬃcients are not statistically 
signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4.8  The eﬀect of AlmaLaurea on unemployment probability
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
AlmaLaurea –.020∗∗   (.008) –.021∗∗   (.008) –.021∗∗   (.008) –.016∗   (.008)
2001 –.101∗∗∗ (.013) –.103∗∗∗ (.013) –.099∗∗∗ (.013) –.073∗∗∗ (.013)
Female .060∗∗∗ (.006) .061∗∗∗ (.005) .061∗∗∗ (.005) –.061∗∗∗ (.005)
Age –.002∗∗   (.001) –.004∗∗∗ (.001) –.004∗∗∗ (.001) –.004∗∗∗ (.001)
High school grade –.002∗∗∗ (.0003) –.001∗∗∗ (.0004) –.001∗∗∗ (.0004) –.001∗∗∗ (.0004)
University grade –.001∗∗   (.005) –.001∗∗   (.001) –.001∗∗  (.0006)
Students per faculty –.002∗∗∗ (.001) –.002∗∗∗ (.001)
Share of delayed students –.018   (.073) –.076   (.077)
GDP –.001∗∗∗ (.0003)
Provincial unemployment .009∗∗∗ (.003)
Dummies on year delay YES YES YES
R2 0.147 0.147 0.149 0.150
Observations   33,463   33,463   33,463   33,463
Notes: The results of four diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations of a linear probability model are displayed. The depen-
dent variable assumes the value 1 if the individual declares not to be working and to be searching, 0 
otherwise. All speciﬁ  cations include university  department ﬁ  xed eﬀects, fourteen dummies for high 
school type, eleven dummies for having another university degree, ﬁ  ve dummies for each parent’s level of 
education, 104 dummies for province of residence before university enrolment. Column (1) includes only 
predetermined individual control, column (2) considers all individual controls, column (3) incorporates 
time- variant university characteristics, and column (4) includes Provincial GDP and unemployment rate. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are clustered at region  degree  year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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reduces its statistical signiﬁ  cance. However, the coeﬃcient is still statistically 
signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level. Quantitatively, this implies that, out of 
the 23,688 individuals that graduated from a member university in 1998, 
379 graduates were out of unemployment as a consequence of AlmaLaurea 
adoption. Although we do not have direct evidence on the extent to which 
AlmaLaurea crowded out other search channels, this ﬁ  nding is plausible if 
one observes the high number of curricula sold by the consortium displayed 
in table 4.3.
Table 4.9 also shows that regional mobility rates have diﬀerent dynamics 
for graduates in AlmaLaurea universities: depending on the controls used, 
AlmaLaurea has a positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on mobility, 
ranging from 2.3 to 2.8 points.27 About 570 individuals, which without the 
consortium would have been resident in the region where they graduated, 
moved to a diﬀerent one.
As mentioned, lower search costs are also expected to improve the quality 
Table 4.9  The eﬀect of AlmaLaurea on mobility
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
AlmaLaurea  .024∗∗   (.011)   .024∗∗   (.012)   .027∗∗   (.012)   .024∗∗   (.012)
2001 –.008   (.007) –.008   (.007)   .007   (.008) –.009   (.011)
Female –.022∗∗∗ (.004) –.022∗∗∗ (.005) –.022∗∗∗ (.005) –.022∗∗∗ (.005)
Age –.001∗∗   (.001)   .0004   (.0006)   .0003   (.0006)   .0002   (.0006)
High school grade   .001∗∗   (.0003)   .0002   (.0003)   .0003   (.0003)   .0004   (.0003)
University grade   .0003   (.0006)   .0003   (.0006)   .0001   (.0006)
Students per faculty   .001   (.001) –.001   (.001)
Share of delayed students –.209∗∗∗ (.001) –.179∗∗   (.077)
GDP –.0005   (.001)
Provincial unemployment –.005   (.004)
Dummies on year delay YES YES YES
R2 0.282 0.283 0.283 0.283
Observations   33,463   33,463   33,463   33,463
Notes: The results of four diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations of a linear probability model are displayed. The depen-
dent variable assumes the value 1 if an individual resides in a diﬀerent region from one where he or she 
attended university, and 0 otherwise. All speciﬁ  cations include university  department ﬁ  xed eﬀects, four-
teen dummies for high school type, eleven dummies for having another university degree, ﬁ  ve dummies 
for each parent’s level of education, 104 dummies for province of residence before university enrolment. 
Column (1) includes only predetermined individual controls, column (2) considers all individual con-
trols, column (3) incorporates time- variant university characteristics, and column (4) includes Provincial 
GDP and unemployment rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are clustered at 
region  degree  year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
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of labor market matches. Table 4.10 shows that, according to our analysis, 
AlmaLaurea signiﬁ  cantly increases monthly wages by about 3 percent.28 
Taking as a reference the average wage, this implies that working graduates 
made about thirty-  ﬁ  ve more euros per month. We also ﬁ  nd that AlmaLau-
rea increases graduates’ satisfaction with the adequacy of the knowledge 
acquired at university, and job stability.29
4.5.2      Universities That Joined in 1998
The previous ﬁ  ndings may be driven by time-  varying omitted univer-
sity characteristics. To investigate whether this is the case, in this section, 
we exploit an additional source of exogenous variation. The universities 
of Turin and Eastern Piedmont joined AlmaLaurea in August 1998 and 
hence sold resumes online only for those 1998 graduates who completed 
Table 4.10  The eﬀect of AlmaLaurea on wages
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
AlmaLaurea  .034∗   (.017)   .036∗∗   (.018)   .035∗   (.018)   .031∗   (.018)
2001 .222∗∗∗ (.015) .227∗∗∗ (.015)   .227∗∗∗ (.016) .201∗∗∗ (.020)
Female –.153∗∗∗ (.008) –.157∗∗∗ (.008) –.158∗∗∗ (.008) –.158∗∗∗ (.008)
Age .013∗∗∗ (.002) .017∗∗∗ (.001) .017∗∗∗ (.002) .017∗∗∗ (.002)
High school grade .005∗∗∗ (.0005) .003∗∗∗ (.0006) .003∗∗∗ (.0006) .003∗∗∗ (.0006)
University grade .005∗∗∗ (.0008) .005∗∗∗ (.0008) .005∗∗∗ (.0008)
Students per faculty   .003∗   (.001)   .002   (.001)
Share of delayed students   .020   (.100)   .055   (.102)
GDP .002∗∗∗ (.0005)
Provincial unemployment –.011∗∗   (.005)
Dummies on year delay YES YES YES
R2 0.252 0.259 0.259 0.260
Observations   20,838   20,838   20,838   20,838
Notes: The results of three diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations of an OLS model are displayed. The dependent vari-
able is the logarithm of monthly net wages. All speciﬁ  cations include university  department ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
fourteen dummies for high school type, eleven dummies for having another university degree, ﬁ  ve dum-
mies for each parent’s level of education, and 104 dummies for province of residence before university 
enrollment. Column (1) includes only predetermined individual control, column (2) considers all indi-
vidual controls, column (3) incorporates time-  variant universities characteristics, and column (4) in-
cludes provincial GDP and provincial unemployment rates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
regressions are clustered at region  degree  year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
28. This result needs to be interpreted with caution because of the possible diﬀerent com-
position of the two samples. In fact, wage regressions are run only for those individuals who 
are employed.
29. Results are not reported but are available upon request by the authors.Do Online Labor Market Intermediaries Matter?    1 4 7
their degree after that date. In our alternative DID setting the new treat-
ment group is composed of graduates from these two universities, with the 
before-  and-  after being graduation after August 1998. In this speciﬁ  cation, 
only 1998 data are considered and dummies for month of graduation are 
included. As table 4.11 shows, AlmaLaurea signiﬁ  cantly decreases unem-
ployment probability by about 2.5 points, which is a similar magnitude to 
Table 4.11  Eﬀect of AlmaLaurea: The case of Turin and Eastern Piedmont
Panel A
Unemployment
    Pre- August   Post- August   Diﬀ.
Turin and Eastern Piedmont .038 .016 –.022




Turin and Eastern Piedmont .165 .164 –.001




Turin and Eastern Piedmont 1,151.4 1,103.9 –47.5
Non-  Turin and Eastern Piedmont 1,152.3 1,134.1 –18.2
Diﬀ. –29.4
Standard error           (32.1)
Panel B
    Unemployment   Mobility   Long wage
AlmaLaurea –.025∗∗∗ (.008)   .009   (.022) –.016   (.018)
Female  .043∗∗∗ (.005) –.021∗∗∗ (.007) –.149∗∗∗ (.009)
Age –.002∗  (.001)  .0005    (.001)  .017∗∗∗ (.002)
High school grade –.001∗∗∗ (.0002)   .0001   (.0003)   .002∗∗∗ (.0006)
University grade –.001∗∗  (.0006)  .0004    (.001)  .005∗∗∗ (.001)
Dummies on year delay YES YES YES
Dummies for month of graduation YES YES YES
R2 0.122 0.251 0.226
Observation   20,547   20,547   12,975
Notes: The analysis is on 1998 graduates. The treatment group is composed of graduates from the uni-
versities of Turin and Eastern Piedmont. Before and after is graduation before and after August. All 
speciﬁ  cations include university  department ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
regressions are clustered at region  degree  year. The bold differences are the result of a DID estimation.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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the eﬀect achieved, as shown previously. However, there is no signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀect on either mobility or wages.
4.6    Unparallel  Outcomes
Possibly the most important threat to the internal validity of the previ-
ously discussed results is the extent to which the “parallel trends” assump-
tion stated in equation (1) is valid. One of the standard ways of assessing its 
plausibility is to use data from the pretreatment periods to check whether 
trends were parallel in the past. If this is the case, it is likely that the results 
achieved here stem from the treatment itself.
The Italian Statistical oﬃce conducted an earlier university-  to-  work 
survey on 1992 graduates, who were interviewed in 1995.30 As depicted in 
ﬁ  gure 4.1, prior to 1998 the employment rate dynamics for the control and 
the treatment groups were remarkably similar. We apply the DID method 
with linear controls on data for 1992 and 1995 graduates; that is, before 
AlmaLaurea came into existence. Table 4.12 shows that the DID coeﬃcient 
30. Unfortunately, the 1995 survey does not include data on wages.
Fig. 4.1    Shares of unemployed graduates
Note: Only graduates from university departments that were in the database in 1995 are con-
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for unemployment is positive, negligible, and not statistically diﬀerent from 
zero. The result is similar for mobility: the AlmaLaurea coeﬃcient is not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero. This reduces the likelihood that the coeﬃcients 
in tables 4.8 and 4.9 stem from unparallel trends in the two groups.
Of course, these checks do not control for time-  speciﬁ  c unparallel out-
comes. In fact, possible interactions between AlmaLaurea enrollment and 
unobserved time-  variant characteristics cannot easily be ruled out. One 
could argue, for example, that those universities that self selected in the 
treatment group are the ones whose unobservable teaching quality improved 
most. This might aﬀect the occupational outcomes of their graduates.
To investigate this possibility we build a placebo treatment group com-
posed of graduates from the universities of Siena and Lecce. According to 
AlmaLaurea oﬃcial sources, these universities decided to join AlmaLaurea 
in 1997, but did not start selling their students’ resumes online until 1999 
and 2003, respectively. If these graduates also experienced an improvement 
vis-  â-  vis the others, the likelihood that AlmaLaurea enrollment proxies for 
something else is higher. We ran a regression similar to the one in equation 
(4), but with graduates from Siena and Lecce as the treatment group and 
non-  AlmaLaurea universities as the control. Table 4.13 shows that this group 
experienced a slight increase in unemployment and wages and a decrease in 
mobility. None of these changes is statistically signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from 
zero. These ﬁ  ndings provide evidence against the possibility that enrollment 
in the treatment group is correlated with unobservables that independently 
cause employment improvements.
Table 4.12  Pre-  adoption falsiﬁ  cation test of AlmaLaurea
      Unemployment   Mobility  
AlmaLaurea .004 (.013) .011 (.012)
1998 –.027∗∗∗ (.008) .005 (.006)
Female .079∗∗∗ (.008) –.026∗∗∗ (.005)
GDP –.001∗∗ (.0004) –.003 (.003)
Provincial unemployment .003 (.002) .001 (.002)
R2 0.150 0.322
  Observations   27,373   27,565  
Notes: In the ﬁ  rst column the dependent variable takes the value 1 if a given graduate is un-
employed, and 0 otherwise. In the second column the dependent variable takes the value 1 if 
a given individual resides in a diﬀerent region from the one where he or she attended universi-
ties. Only individuals that graduated in 1992 and 1995 are considered. AlmaLaurea takes the 
value 1 for 1995 graduates from universities that enroll in AlmaLaurea between 1995 and 1998. 
All speciﬁ  cations include university  department ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses. All regressions are clustered at region  degree  year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.150        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
4.7      Alternative Treatment and Control Groups and Displacement Eﬀect
The DID design can be further strengthened using alternative treatment 
and comparison groups. In fact, this is likely to reduce the importance of 
biases or random variation occurring in a single setting (Meyer 1995). In the 
ideal speciﬁ  cation, treatment and control groups should face the same time-
 speciﬁ  c shocks: the more similar the two groups are, the better. Given that 
our dependent variables concern labor market outcomes and that (accord-
ing to our data when the survey took place) more than 75 percent of Italian 
graduates reside in the region where they attended university (see table 4.7), 
a new sample is created including only graduates from regions that include 
both AlmaLaurea and non-  AlmaLaurea universities.
Three Italian regions ﬁ  t this criterion: Tuscany, Abruzzo, and Sicily. Grad-
uates in these regions represent about 17 percent of the entire population 
and, within this group, about 57 percent of graduates are in the treatment 
group universities. As can be seen from ﬁ  gure 4.2, AlmaLaurea universities 
are Florence, Chieti, Catania, and Messina. Non-  AlmaLaurea universities 
are Pisa, Siena, L’Aquila, Teramo, and Palermo. Table 4.14 shows that with 
respect to the general case, in this setting AlmaLaurea has a stronger eﬀect 
on employment probability (3.5 points) and wages (5 percent) and about the 
same impact on mobility. The result for wages is not statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
Overall, however, the general results are conﬁ  rmed and even strengthened.
This control exercise is also helpful for checking for an additional poten-
tial problem in our analysis. As mentioned in section 4.3, graduates from 
nearby universities might be used to assess whether there is a displacement 
eﬀect on non-  AlmaLaurea students due to a reallocation of hiring. Inter-
actions are in fact more likely for graduates’ occupational outcomes from 
nearby universities. Hence, for example, the impact of AlmaLaurea might 
be exaggerated if individuals in the control group were negatively aﬀected 
by AlmaLaurea itself. For instance, Pisa, in principle, is a better control 
group for Florence than Bari; nevertheless, the risk that its graduates’ labor 
market performance is negatively aﬀected by the presence of AlmaLaurea in 
Florence is higher. To control for this possibility, we perform a DID analysis 
Table 4.13  Eﬀect of AlmaLaurea using a placebo treatment group
      Unemployment   Mobility   Log wage  
Placebo AlmaLaurea .024 –.017 .011
(.025) (.026) (.036)
R2 0.152 0.389 0.260
  Observations   26,278   26,278   16,464  
Notes: Placebo AlmaLaurea takes the value 1 for graduates for 1998 from the universities of 
Siena and Lecce, 0 otherwise. All speciﬁ  cations include the full set of controls used in the 4th 
columns of tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are 
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with non-  AlmaLaurea universities in regions where there are AlmaLaurea 
universities constituting the treatment group, with the control group being 
the remaining non-  AlmaLaurea universities. From table 4.15, it can be seen 
that there are no signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences in the trajectories of the two groups. 
This suggests that there are no major interactions among the graduates in 
the two groups and that AlmaLaurea does not have negative spillovers on 
universities located close by.
4.8    Conclusions
Since the late 1990s we have seen a large increase in the importance of 
online labor market intermediaries. While their diﬀusion may potentially 
Fig. 4.2    Regions with both AlmaLaurea and non-  AlmaLaurea universities
Note: Map displays only those cities that have a university.152        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
improve labor market functioning, increasing the total quantity and qual-
ity of matches, solid evidence of their beneﬁ  ts is still missing. In addition, 
recent works have underlined the possibility of adverse selection in the use 
of electronic intermediaries among the unemployed (Kuhn and Skuterud 
2004).
In this article we exploited the exceptional case study provided by the early 
adoption of the online intermediary AlmaLaurea by several Italian universi-
ties. The absence of other electronic intermediaries for those universities that 
had not adopted AlmaLaurea at the time of our study provides us with an 
adequate control group to estimate the eﬀect of the treatment.
We employed the diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences method on a repeated cross-
  sectional data set. Given that enrollment in AlmaLaurea is not random, 
evaluating its impact is not trivial. However, assuming parallel outcomes 
Table 4.14  Alternative treatment and control groups, based on geographic proximity
      Unemployment   Mobility   Wage  
AlmaLaurea –.035∗∗ .024∗ .053
(.017) (.026) (.039)
R2 0.149 0.492 0.263
  Observations   6,225   6,225   3,521  
Notes: Only graduates from regions that have both AlmaLaurea and non- AlmaLaurea univer-
sities are included. All speciﬁ  cations include the full set of controls used in column (4) of tables 
4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions are clustered at 
region  degree  year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4.15  The eﬀect of AlmaLaurea on nearby universities
      Unemployment   Mobility   Wage  
AlmaLaurea –.008 .006 .010
(.012) (.015) (.023)
R2 0.152 0.295 0.260
  Observations   26,436   26,436   16,464  
Notes: Only individuals who graduated from non-  AlmaLaurea universities are included. The 
variable AlmaLaurea takes the value 1 if a 1998 graduate is awarded a degree from a non- 
AlmaLaurea university that is located in a region where there are also AlmaLaurea universities, 
and 0 otherwise. All speciﬁ  cations include the full set of controls in the 4th columns of tables 
4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are clustered at 
region  degree  year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Do Online Labor Market Intermediaries Matter?    1 5 3
between treatment and control group makes our estimation valid. The inclu-
sion of time- variant indicators concerning individual and university charac-
teristics and standard tests aimed at ruling out alternative explanations do 
not raise major concerns in relation to this important assumption.
The evidence shows that the adoption of the online labor market interme-
diary under study improved graduates’ labor market outcomes three years 
after graduation. In particular, according to our most conservative estimate, 
AlmaLaurea decreased graduates’ unemployment probability by about 1.6 
percentage points.
Our study also suggests that online labor market intermediaries may have 
a positive eﬀect on matching quality. In fact, in our case study, the wages of 
graduates from member universities increased by about 3 percent. Finally, 
we also observe an increase in mobility by about 2.4 percentage points.
The ﬁ  ndings of this chapter are speciﬁ  c to a given segment of the labor 
market (i.e., university-  to-  work transition) and to a peculiar electronic 
intermediary. Thus, their external validity has to be carefully assessed. In 
particular, the single characteristic of AlmaLaurea that possibly made it a 
successful intermediary is also the most unusual: member universities certify 
the information contained in electronic curricula and also provide some 
information on the entire population of graduates. This important caveat 
helps to integrate our ﬁ  ndings within the existing literature that does not ﬁ  nd 
any eﬀect of online search on the overall unemployment rates and duration 
(Kuhn and Skuterud 2004; Kroft and Pope 2008).
The results presented in this chapter also contribute to the policy discus-
sion on the university-  to-  work transition. The poor labor performance of 
Italian graduates has been traditionally ascribed to demand- and- supply fac-
tors. We show that graduate labor market functioning can also be improved 
by the introduction of online intermediaries.
In future research we aim at exploring whether the positive impact of 
electronic labor market intermediaries aﬀects the whole graduate population 
evenly. Also, while in this chapter we focus on average outcomes, the eﬀect 
on outcome distribution remains an issue for further research.
References
Autor, D. H. 2001. Wiring the labor market. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (1): 
25–40.
Bagues, M., M. Sylos Labini, and N. Zinovyeva. Forthcoming. Diﬀerential grading 
standards and university funding: Evidence from Italy. CESifo Economic Stud-
ies.
Burdett, K., and J. Ondrich. 1985. How changes in labor demand aﬀect unemployed 
workers. Journal of Labor Economics 3 (1): 1–10.154        Manuel F. Bagues and Mauro Sylos Labini
Congressional Budget Oﬃce. 2002. The eﬀect of changes in the labor markets on the 
natural rate of unemployment, April.
Freeman, R. B. 2002. The labor market in the new information economy. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 18 (3): 288–305.
Heckman, J. J. 1990. Varieties of selection bias. American Economic Review 80 (2): 
313–18.
Kroft, K., and D. G. Pope. 2008. Does online search crowd out traditional search 
and improve matching eﬃciency? Evidence from Craigslist. Unpublished manu-
script. University of California, Berkeley.
Kuhn, P. 2000. The Internet and matching in labor markets in New economy hand-
book, ed. D. C. Jones, 508–23. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Kuhn, P., and M. Skuterud. 2004. Internet job search and unemployment duration. 
American Economic Review 94 (1): 218–32.
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. 2002. Indicators on school-  to- 
work transitions in Europe. Mannheim, Germany: Mzes.
Meyer, B. D. 1995. Natural and quasi- experiments in economics. Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics 13: 151–61.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2007. Educa-
tion at a glance. Paris: OECD.
Pissarides, C. 2000. Equilibrium unemployment theory. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Rebick, M. E. 2000. The importance of networks in the market for university grad-
uates in Japan: A longitudinal analysis of hiring patterns. Oxford Economic Papers 
52 (3): 471–96.
Rubin, D. B. 1974. Estimating causal eﬀects of treatments in randomized and non-
randomized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology 66:688–701.
Stevenson, B. 2008. The Internet and job search. University of Pennsylvania. NBER 
Working Paper no. 13886. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, March.